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Abstract
We incorporate house price risk and mortgages into a standard incomplete market (SIM)
model. We calibrate the model to match U.S. data, and we show that the model also ac-
counts for non-targeted features of the data such as the distribution of down payments, the
life-cycle prole of home ownership, and the mortgage default rate. In addition, we show
that the average coecients that measure the agents' ability to self-insure against income
shocks are similar to those of a SIM model without housing (as presented by Kaplan and
Violante, 2010). However, incorporating housing increases the values of these coecients
for younger agents, which narrows the gap between the SIM model's implications and the
data. The response of consumption to house price shocks is minimal. We also study the
eects of default prevention policies. Introducing a minimum down payment requirement of
15% reduces defaults on mortgages by 30%, reduces the home ownership rate up to only 0.2
percentage points (if the aggregate house price level does not adjust), and may cause house
prices to decline up to 0.7% (if home ownership does not adjust). Garnishing defaulters'
income in excess of 43% of median consumption for one year produces a similar decline in
defaults; but, since it reduces the median equilibrium down payment from 19% to 9%, it
boosts home ownership up to 4.3 percentage points (if the aggregate house price level does
not adjust) and may increase house prices up to 16.1% (if home ownership does not adjust).
The introduction of minimum down payments or income garnishment benet a majority of
the population.
JEL classication: D60, E21, E44.
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This paper proposes a model that accounts for the observed behavior of mortgage borrowing and
default in the U.S. and then uses the model to study the eects of introducing minimum down
payment requirements and allowing lenders to garnish defaulters' income. Mortgage defaults are
widely seen as costly, which has led to both academic and policy discussions about the reduction
of default rates. For instance, in the U.S., Qualied Residential Mortgage rules proposed by
regulators make higher down payments necessary to obtain more favorable interest rates. Critics
argue that these rules could have signicant negative eects on the home ownership rate (see,
for example, MBA, 2011). Others have proposed to allow mortgage creditors to take defaulters'
assets or income (see, for example, Feldstein, 2008). The ndings in this paper shed light on the
possible eects of such mortgage default prevention policies (?, describes the utilization of these
policies accross countries).
We propose an extension of a standard incomplete market (SIM) model.1 In particular, we
follow closely the model studied by Kaplan and Violante (2010), but we introduce housing, house
price risk, and mortgages. We model mortgages as long-term loans that can be renanced or
enter into default in any period and are collateralized by a house. There are no restrictions on
the initial down payment other than the requirement that it be non-negative. Interest rates are
set endogenously and depend on the default probability.
We calibrate our model to match income and house price shocks, the median net-worth, the
mean house price-to-income ratio, and the home ownership rate in the U.S. Since the home
equity position is the key determinant of mortgage default decisions, plugging into the model a
realistic process for house price shocks seems crucial for our objective of accounting for defaults
and studying implications of default prevention policies.
We nd that the model ts non-targeted features of the data. In particular, the endogenous
distribution of down payments generated by the model is similar to its empirical counterpart.
Again, since the home equity position is the key determinant of mortgage default decisions,
1See Carroll (1997), Huggett (1993, 1996), Kaplan and Violante (2010), Krusell and Smith (2006), and R os-
Rull (1995).
1the fact that the model generates a plausible distribution of down payments seems crucial for
accounting for default behavior. Furthermore, since the policy exercises we study aect the equi-
librium through borrowing constraints, it seems important that the model generates a plausible
endogenous borrowing behavior. The model also predicts a life-cycle prole of home ownership
and a mortgage default rate similar to their empirical counterparts.
We also study the model's predictions about agents' ability to self-insure. This is important
because agents' welfare is determined by their ability to borrow and insure against shocks. We
nd that consumption inequality increases substantially over the life cycle but less than earnings
inequality, and its increase is approximately linear. This is consistent with the ndings in previ-
ous studies (see, for example, Storesletten et al., 2004; Kaplan and Violante, 2010). Furthermore,
in our benchmark, average insurance coecients for income shocks (see Blundell et al., 2008) are
very close to the coecients we obtain in our model without housing and very close to the ones
reported by Kaplan and Violante (2010) from their SIM model without housing. While incorpo-
rating housing does not have a signicant eect on the average value of insurance coecients, it
increases the values of these coecients for younger agents. Kaplan and Violante (2010) argue
that the life-cycle proles of insurance coecients in the data are atter than the ones predicted
by a SIM model. Thus, our ndings indicate that housing narrows the gap between the SIM
model's implications and the data.
We also nd that, as in Li and Yao (2007), house price shocks are not an important source
of consumption inequality. On the one hand, since housing is a major component of agents'
portfolios, one could expect house price shocks to be an important source of risk and cross-
sectional heterogeneity. On the other hand, one could expect this role to be less important
because a house is not only an investment vehicle but also a consumption good. Using the
insurance coecients proposed by Blundell et al. (2008), we nd that 98% of the variance of
house price shocks does not translate into changes in consumption. Estimating the marginal
propensity to consume housing wealth is a dicult task, and therefore there is a wide range
of estimated values (see Carroll et al., 2011, and references therein). Our ndings support the
expectation of a low marginal propensity to consume housing wealth that results from agents'
need to consume housing services (see Benito et al., 2006).
2We use the model to perform two policy experiments that shed light on recent discussions
about mortgage default prevention policies. First, we study the eects of requiring a minimum
down payment. Recall that in our benchmark there is only a non-negative down payment re-
striction. We nd that requiring a minimum down payment of 15% of the house value reduces
defaults on mortgages by 30%, reduces the home ownership rate up to only 0.2 percentage points
(if the aggregate house price level does not adjust), and may cause house prices to decline up
to 0.7% (if home ownership does not adjust). On the one hand, most home owners (and thus
a majority of the population) benet from improved credit conditions. The minimum down
payment requirement increases the cost of defaulting because it implies that it would be more
dicult for a defaulter to buy a house in the future. Thus, when the minimum down payment
requirement is imposed, home owners can renance their mortgage at lower interest rates. On
the other hand, prospective home buyers are typically worse o with minimum down payment
requirements because the requirements make buying a house more dicult.
Second, we study the eects of allowing for garnishment of a defaulter's income. Our bench-
mark calibration does not allow for garnishment. In most U.S. states, legislation (such as
bankruptcy, foreclosure, deciency, and non-recourse laws) limits the defaulter's responsibil-
ity for the dierence between the value of the collateral and his debt. We nd that garnishing
defaulters' income in excess of 43% of median consumption for one year reduces defaults on
mortgages by 30%.
Because income garnishment increases the cost of defaulting, under garnishment agents can
borrow with a low interest rate even with a low down payment. In our experiment, the potential
for garnishment reduces the median down payment from 19% of the house value to 9%. Conse-
quently, it boosts home ownership by up to 4.3 percentage points (if the aggregate house price
level does not adjust) and may increase house prices up to 16.1% (if home ownership does not
adjust). The improved credit conditions implied by the potential for garnishment benet most
agents. But, since we impose garnishment on existing debt contracts, agents who are very likely
to default are worse o with this policy.
32 The model
We study a life-cycle SIM model close to the one presented by Kaplan and Violante (2010).
As they do, we model the choices of an agent who lives up to T periods and works until age
W  T. In contrast with their study, we assume that (i) in addition to consuming non-durable
goods, the agent consumes housing; (ii) in addition to earning shocks, the agent faces house price
shocks; and (iii) borrowing options are endogenously given by lenders' zero-prot conditions on
mortgages contracts.
2.1 Housing
We present a stylized model of housing that follows closely the one presented by Campbell and
Cocco (2003).2 As in Campbell and Cocco (2003), we assume that the agent must live in a house
and that, in any given period, the agent may own up to one house. For simplicity, we assume all
houses the agent could own deliver the same housing services and have the same price, pt. This
price changes stochastically over time. If the agent owns a house, he must live in the house he
owns. The cost of buying a house is Bpt, and the cost of selling a house is Spt.
We depart from Campbell and Cocco (2003) by allowing the agent to choose whether to
own or rent his house. For simplicity, we assume a constant renting cost r that the agent must
pay each period in which he chooses to rent. Assuming a constant renting cost facilitates the
assurance that the agent can always aord housing. There is a disutility from renting denoted















where  denotes the subjective discount factor, t;t+s denotes the probability on being alive at
age t + s conditional of being alive at age t, ct denotes consumption at age t,  denotes the
curvature parameter, and It = 1 (It = 0) if the agent is renting (owns a house). All agents alive
at the beginning of age T die with certainty at the end of that period.
2Campbell and Cocco (2003) study the optimal choice between xed-rate mortgages and adjustable-rate mort-
gages in an environment with ination and interest rate risk.
42.2 Earning and house price stochastic processes
We allow for correlation between earnings and house prices. As it is standard in the housing
literature, we explicitly allow for predictability in house prices (see Corradin et al., 2010; Nagaraja
et al., 2009, and references therein). In particular, following Nagaraja et al. (2009), the log of
the house price is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
log(pt+1) = (1   p)log( p) + p log(pt) + t; (1)
where  p is the mean price.
Each period, the agent receives an endowment of income yt. Before retirement, income has a
persistent component, a life-cycle component, and an i.i.d component:
log(yt) = zt + ft + "t;
where
zt = zzt 1 + et;
" is normally distributed with variance 2
", and e and  are jointly normally distributed with
correlation e; and variances 2
e and 2
:
Note that we abstract from the xed component in the agent's earning process used in the
literature to capture dierences such as education (see, for example, Krueger and Perri, 2006).
This abstraction is convenient because we assume the agent can only choose from two possible
levels of housing services (as he chooses whether to own or rent).3
It is well understood that social security may play an important role in terms of risk-sharing.
We model social security using a concave schedule as in Storesletten et al. (2004) but, in order to
economize one state variable, we use the last realization of the persistent component of working-
age income as a proxy for the lifetime average income. Benets are equal to 90% of average past
earnings up to a rst bend point, 32% from this rst bend point to a second bend point, and
15% from this second bend point to a third bend point, and xed at the level of the third bend
3Alternatively, for each level of the xed component in the agent's earning process, we could compute one
economy with two levels of housing services. Because the income elasticity of housing consumption is close to 1
(see Aguiar and Bils, 2011), we expect each of these economies would be very similar to the one we study.
5point beyond that. The three bend points are set at, respectively, 0.18, 1.10, and 2.30 times
cross-sectional average gross earnings.
2.3 Mortgage contracts and savings
Mortgage loans are the only loans available to the agent and he can have up to one mortgage.
A mortgage for an agent of age t is a promise to make constant payments of b > 0 for next
n = T  t years or to cancel his debt in any period before T by paying the value of the remaining











j ; if b > 0
1; otherwise.
The agent can default on his mortgage. If the agent chooses to default he hands in his house
to his lender who sells it with a discount at pt(1   S), with 0  S  1. The lender also may
garnish part of the defaulter's income,
(b;y;p;n) = minfmaxfy   ;0g;q
(n)b   pg;
where  denotes the minimum subsistence consumption that the agent is legally entitled to and
q(n)b   p denotes the deciency balance after the foreclosed property is sold. The agent must
rent in the period in which he defaults.
Each period, a home owner with positive expected home equity receives a transfer (b0;p;n)
equal to his discounted expected next-period home equity position (net of the cost of selling the
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where n denotes the probability of being alive next period at age T  n. If the home owner dies,
the nancial intermediary who contracted with the home owner receives the house. After paying
the selling cost, the nancial intermediary sells the house and uses the proceeds to pay to the
mortgage holder the minimum between the mortgage prepayment amount and the proceeds from
6the house sale. Mortgages are priced by risk-neutral lenders who make zero expected prots and
have an opportunity cost of lending given by the interest rate r.4
We denote by b0 the agent's initial asset position. If the agent does not have a mortgage, he can
save using one-period annuities. If the agent has a mortgage, he can save only by accumulating
home equity.
2.4 Timing
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the agent observes the
realization of his earning and house price shocks. After observing his shocks, the agent makes his
housing and borrowing decisions. If the agent enters the period as a renter, he chooses to either
become a home owner or to stay as a renter. If the agent enters the period as a home owner
with a mortgage, he can: (i) make his current-period mortgage payment; (ii) default; (iii) sell the
house, prepay his mortgage, rent, and save; and (iv) prepay and change his nancial position. If
the agent enters the period as a home owner without a mortgage, he chooses whether to stay in
his house or sell his house, as well as his next-period nancial position.
2.5 Recursive formulation
The lifetime utility of an agent who enters the period as a renter and can live up to n periods is
given by
R(b;z;";p;n) = maxfG();B()g; (2)
where b  0 denotes the renter's saving level at the beginning of the period, G denotes the
lifetime utility of an agent who decides to stay as a renter during the period and B denotes the
lifetime utility of an agent who buys a house in the period.
If the agent continues renting, he can choose his next-period savings b0  0. Since the agent
saves using one-period annuities, in order to have an asset level of b0  0 next period, he needs
4In a model with asymmetric information about the borrower's type, Guler (2008) study the eects of im-
provements in the lenders' ability to assess mortgage credit risk.
7to save
n



















Let b0q(b0;z;p;n) denote the resources the agent obtains with a mortgage that promises to pay
b0 > 0 per period, or the resources the agent has to save if he wants to have  b0 > 0 of nancial
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In the expressions above, Ipay(b0;z0;"0;p0;n 1) is an indicator function that is equal to one (zero)
if the optimal choice of an agent with states (b0;z0;"0;p0;n   1) is to make (to not make) his
current-period mortgage payment; Iprepay(b0;z0;"0;p0;n   1) is equal to one (zero) if his optimal
choice is (is not) to prepay his mortgage; Idefault(b0;z0;"0;p0;n   1) is equal to one (zero) if his
optimal choice is (is not) to default.
The expected discounted lifetime utility of an agent who decides to buy a house satises
B(b;z;";p;n) = max
b0 fu(y   b + b
0q(b










0;z;p;n)  p; (5)






maxfP();D();S();F()gif b > 0
maxfM();S()g otherwise.
(6)
8If b > 0, H is the maximum among four options. The value of the rst option is given by P, the
expected discounted lifetime utility of making the current-period mortgage payment, in which
case the agent cannot further adjust his nancial asset position and b0 = b,
P(b;z;";p;n) = u(y   b + (b;p;n)) + nE[H(b;z
0;"
0;p
0;n   1)jz;p]: (7)
The second value is given by D, the expected discounted lifetime utility of defaulting, in which
case the agent cannot save or borrow and b0 = 0,
D(b;z;";p;n) = u(y   (b;z;";p;n)   r)    + nE[R(0;z
0;"
0;p
0;n   1)jz;p]: (8)
The value of the third option is given by S, the expected discounted lifetime utility of selling the



















The fourth and last value is given by F, the expected discounted lifetime utility of prepaying the
mortgage and then asking for a new mortgage or saving,
F(b;z;";p;n) = max











0;z;p;n)  p: (11)
If b  0, there are only two options. The rst option is selling the house and then becoming a
renter. The value of this option is S. The second option is to continue as an owner. The value
of this option is given by M,
M(b;z;";p;n) = max











0;z;p;n)  p: (13)
Borrowing constraints in equations (5), (11), and (13) imply that the agent cannot ask for a
mortgage with a loan-to-value ratio higher that 100%. With these constraints, a version of our
model with pt = 0 8t is a SIM model without housing and with a zero borrowing limit. This
facilitates the comparison of our ndings with those of previous studies.
92.6 Discussion of main assumptions
There are several characteristics of our framework that are important in accounting for our results
and in dierentiating our work from other studies. We assume the agent chooses his debt level.5
This contrasts with the approach in other studies where the borrower's choice is restricted to
a small predetermined set of down payment levels. Since home equity is a key determinant of
mortgage default decisions, having a realistic distribution of down payments seems crucial for
accounting for mortgage defaults. More importantly, a clear advantage of our approach is that
it allows for endogenous changes in down payment levels (that we nd are signicant) when we
perform policy experiments that change the mortgage contracts available to the agent.
We assume that home equity is aected by shocks to house prices that do not aect the
services the agent obtains from the house. Thus, our house price shocks aect both the agent's
wealth and the price of housing services. Our approach contrasts with the one in previous studies
that model shocks to the house value as depreciation shocks that aect the agent's wealth but
do not aect the price of housing. Allowing for house price shocks that aect both wealth and
housing prices could be important for accounting for the eects of these shocks on non-housing
consumption and mortgage default decisions. Additionally, our modeling allows us to calibrate
the stochastic process for house prices using estimations obtained with micro data. Previous
studies often calibrate depreciation shocks to match the default rate.
We assume the agent borrows using exible long-term debt contracts. This contrasts with
previous studies that assume one-period debt. Long-term debt helps the model generate mortgage
defaults given realistic house price changes, as these changes accumulate over time. In addition,
each period we allow the agent to renance by prepaying his mortgage and asking for a new
mortgage. In most previous studies, renancing is not possible or is expensive. Allowing for
renancing makes it possible to study how changes in the mortgage contracts available to the
agent may aect homeowners who may want to renance in the future. As most studies of
mortgage debt, we do not allow mortgage debtors to hold multiple mortgages (or home-equity
5Our modeling of mortgages extends the equilibrium default model  a la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) that has
been used in quantitative studies of credit card debt (see, for example, Athreya, 2005, 2006; Chatterjee et al.,
2007).
10lines of credit). However, since we allow for prepayment, the agent can change his home equity
position. Since home equity is a key determinant of default decisions, the agent must be able
to adjust his equity position to be able to choose his exposure to default risk. Importantly, we
allow the interest rate on mortgage contracts to be a function of the borrower's characteristics.
This eliminates protable deviations for lenders. Previous studies pool borrowers with dierent
characteristics into the same mortgage contract.6
There are two key simplifying assumptions in our framework. First, we assume mortgage
payments are constant and the mortgage duration is xed. However, because we allow borrowers
to modify their debt level every period, they can choose a decreasing or increasing pattern of
mortgage payments and change the eective duration of their mortgage. Second, as it is standard
in models of bankruptcy (Chatterjee et al. (2007)), to save computation time we do not allow
agents to hold debt and assets at the same time. However, since we allow borrowers to modify
the equity they have in their house, they can change their savings every period. We show in
section 4.2 that the agent's ability to self-insure in our framework is comparable to the one in
the SIM model without housing where the agent saves using nancial assets.
Finally, in order to facilitate the comparison of our ndings with those of previous studies of
household risk and cross-sectional heterogeneity, we incorporate the features discussed above in
a life-cycle SIM model. When we assume that house prices are equal to zero, our model is very
similar to the model without housing studied by Kaplan and Violante (2010).
3 Calibration
We calibrate the model using data for the U.S. A period in the model refers to a year; agents
enter the model at age 22, retire at age 62, and die no later than at age 82. Survival rates are
obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. We assume that the initial asset
position matches the mean net asset position at age 22 in the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Our strategy is to feed into the model stochastic processes for income and prices estimated
6Corbae and Quintin (2010) show that pooling borrowers into the same contract could aect their results
signicantly. They discuss how much of the recent rise in foreclosures can be explained by the introduction of
mortgage contracts with low down payments and delayed amortization.
11using micro data. We pin down the variance of house price innovations 2
 and the correlation of
income and house price innovations (e;) by seeking to match the standard deviation of house
price growth and the correlation between house price growth and income growth estimated by
Campbell and Cocco (2003), p = 0:115 and p;y = 0:027, where
p = log(pt+1)   log(pt);
y = log(yt+1)   log(yt);
and p and p;y are, respectively, the standard deviation of p and the correlation coecient
of p and y. We use the estimate of the persistence of house prices (p) by Nagaraja et al.
(2009).
The life-cycle component of the income process is calibrated following Kaplan and Violante
(2010). The estimated prole peaks after 21 years of labor market experience at twice the initial
value, and then it slowly declines to 80% of the peak value. The parameters e;" and z are set
according to Storesletten et al. (2004).
For our benchmark, we assume that there is no income garnishment after default; i.e., we
assume that  is higher than the maximum possible income level. In Section 5.4 we solve the
model for dierent values of . We assume rent is zero (r = 0) to ensure that agents are
always able to aord renting. Therefore, the only cost of renting is determined by the disutility
parameter .7
The disutility from renting, the discount factor, and the mean house price are calibrated to
match the home ownership rate, the mean house price-to-income ratio, and median home equity.
The mean house price is the key parameter that allows us to match the mean house price-to-
income ratio. The discount factor is the key parameter that allows us to match the median
home equity, while the disutility associated with renting is the key parameter to determine home
ownership in our simulations.
We use estimations presented in previous studies to set the remaining parameter values. We
7Chambers et al. (2009a) present a richer model of the home ownership decision and account for the boom
in home ownership from 1994 to 2005 by examining the roles of demographic changes and mortgage innovations.
Chambers et al. (2009b) study dierent policies to foster owner-occupied housing and how housing impacts the
eects of income tax reforms.
12set  = 2, which is within the range of accepted values in studies of real business cycles. Following
Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009), we set r = 2%. We set the cost of buying and selling a house
using estimates in Gruber and Martin (2003) and Pennington-Cross (2006). Table 1 presents the
value of all parameters used.
4 Results
We solve the model using the discrete state space method. For b, we use 300 evenly spaced grid
points between -20 and 20, and 200 evenly spaced grid points between -120 and -20.8 The grid
for income and house price shocks are obtained according to Terry and Knotek II (2008). In all
cases we center points around the mean and we use a radius of 3 standard deviations. For the
permanent income shock we use 15 grid points, for the transitory income shock we use 5, and for
the house price shock we use 11. We simulate the behavior of 20,000 agents during their lifetime.
Statistics are computed using Census data to assign population weights to each cohort.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. First, we discuss the ability of our benchmark
model to match basic features of the housing and mortgage markets. Second, we discuss the
agent's ability to self-insure. Third, we study the eect of imposing minimum down payment
restrictions. Fourth, we discuss the eects of introducing income garnishment.
4.1 Housing and mortgages
Table 2 reports moments in the data and in our simulations. Statistics are computed using agents
younger than 62 years of age. The data are taken from the 2004 SCF (Survey of Consumer
Finances).9
Table 2 shows that we approximate well the three targeted moments: home ownership, mean
price-to-income ratio, and median net worth-to-income ratio. This table also illustrates a tension
between approximating home equity and net worth in the data. This tension is not surprising
8Hatchondo et al. (2010) discuss the computation cost of obtaining accurate solutions in equilibrium default
models.
9We consider agents between 22 and 62 years of age that are not in the top 5 percentile of wealth for compa-
rability with the data generated using the model.
13Table 1: Parameter values.
Parameter Value Denition Basis
2
 0:302 Variance of  Campbell and Cocco (2003)
e; 0:115 Correlation e and  Campbell and Cocco (2003)
p 0:970 Persistence in p Nagaraja et al. (2009)
f(a) { Life-cycle component Kaplan and Violante (2010)
2
" 0:0630 Variance of " Storesletten et al. (2004)
2
e 0:0166 Variance of e Storesletten et al. (2004)
z 0:990 Persistence in z Storesletten et al. (2004)
 1 Income not subject to garnishing No garnishment
r 0 Rent Positive consumption
r 0:020 Risk-free rate Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009)
b0 0:250 Initial wealth SCF
 2:000 Risk aversion Standard RBC
B 0:025 Cost of buying, hhds Gruber and Martin (2003)
S 0:070 Cost of selling, hhds Gruber and Martin (2003)
S 0:220 Cost of selling, bank Pennington-Cross (2006)
 0:105 Renting disutility Calibrated to match targets
p 5:699 Mean price Calibrated to match targets
 0:945 Discount factor Calibrated to match targets
14Table 2: Benchmark simulations
Data 2004 Model
Home ownership rate (%) 64.5 63.1
Mean price-to-income ratio 2.6 2.6
Median net-worth-to-income ratio 1.4 1.4
Mean equity-to-price ratio (%) 50.0 65.7
since in our model borrowers can save only by increasing their home equity. In spite of generating
mean equity that is too high, our model can generate poor agents with negative equity who are
willing to default. The default rate generated by the model is 0.6%, which is close to the default
rate of 0.5% used by Jeske et al. (2010).10
In addition, our model matches other measures of indebtedness in the data. Figure 1 shows
that the endogenous distribution of down payments generated by the model matches closely
its empirical counterpart. We constructed the empirical distribution using data on combined
loan-to-value ratios at origination for the 2000-2009 period presented by Paniza Bontas (2010).11
Figure 2 shows that the model also generates an increasing life-cycle prole of home ownership,
similar to the one observed in the data. Note that this occurs even though our calibration targets
only the average home ownership rate.
In order to illustrate the importance of assuming long-term debt for generating defaults,
we computed the share of mortgages in default by age (or tenure) of the contract using our
simulations. The results are depicted in Figure 3. Most defaults result from the accumulation of
10Jeske et al. (2010) study the macroeconomic eects of a mortgage interest rate subsidy. They explain that
the quarterly foreclosure rate was 0.4% between 2000 and 2006 and that the ratio of mortgages in foreclosure
that eventually end in liquidation was 25% in 2005 (as reported by the Mortgage Bankers Association). They
argue that since a default in their model implies that the agent hands in his house to the bank, the default rate
in the model should be closer to the liquidation rate in the data. They also argue that since the default rate in
the data is for a period of strong house price appreciation, they should target a higher default rate.
11Paniza Bontas (2010) presents a detailed description of the data. We thank Jennifer Paniza Bontas for sharing
her data with us. That the model generates a share of mortgages with zero down payments lower than the one in
the data could be explained by the lack of growth of the aggregate house price level in the model (which contrasts
with the high growth of the aggregate house price level observed between 2000 and 2009).
15Figure 1: Down payment distribution





















house price declines over several periods. Only 6% of the mortgages in default were acquired in
the previous period.
Another central aspect of mortgage contracts in our model is that, every period, the agent
can modify his contract. Consequently, in spite of our assumption of a unique mortgage with
constant payments and a given nominal duration, the agent can choose a decreasing or increasing
pattern of payments and the eective duration of his debt. Figure 4 shows that agents use the
prepayment option often: 51% of mortgages are less than ve years old.12
The prepayment option also implies that, even though we assume debtors cannot hold nan-
cial assets, they can choose to adjust their saving level by adjusting their home equity. In the
next subsection we show that the saving exibility we give to agents seems to be enough for the
12It should be mentioned that, since our model does not allow for multiple mortgages and home equity lines of
credit, the agent can adjust his home equity only by pre-paying his mortgage. Thus, one should not attempt to
match the mortgage tenure distribution in the data with the one predicted by the model.
16Figure 2: Home ownership over the life cycle






































model to produce reasonable consumption smoothing predictions.
4.2 Self-insurance
In this section, we assess the agent's ability to self-insure against each of the three shocks in our
benchmark. Recall that, for tractability, we assume that debtors cannot hold nancial assets.
Thus, debtors can adjust their savings only by changing their home equity (which they can do
by prepaying their mortgage and obtaining a new mortgage with no transaction cost).13 We
show that our simplifying assumption does not seem to impair debtors' ability to self-insure
against adverse shocks: The response of consumption to income shocks implied by our model is
13Even though there are no transaction costs for renancing, when the agent prepays his mortgage future
payments are discounted at the risk-free rate, which, because of the default premia, may be lower than the
interest rate at which he borrows. This dierence is not quantitatively important.
17Figure 3: Mortgages in default by tenure (in the simulations)
















comparable with the response implied by a SIM model without housing in which the agent saves
using nancial assets.
As in Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan and Violante (2010), we dene the insurance coecient
for shock xit as





where the variance and covariance are taken cross-sectionally over the entire population.14 Sim-
ilarly, the insurance coecient at age t, x
t, is computed using the variance and covariance
calculated for all agents of age t. The insurance coecient is interpreted as the share of the
variance of the x shock that does not translate into consumption growth.
Table 3 presents the value of insurance coecients in the simulations of our benchmark. This
14Also as in Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan and Violante (2010), when computing insurance coecients, log
consumption and log after-tax earnings are dened as residuals from an age prole.
18Figure 4: Mortgages not in default by tenure (in the simulations)
















table also presents these coecients for a version of our model without housing (pt = 0 8t) and
with an adjusted discount factor ( = 0:96) that implies the median net worth to income ratio
in the benchmark. Comparing coecients for that version of the model with the ones for our
benchmark helps us to tease out how introducing housing aects the predictions of a SIM model
about the agent's ability to self-insure against income shocks. In addition, this table presents
the data coecients estimated by Blundell et al. (2008) (standard errors in parenthesis) and the
coecients obtained by Kaplan and Violante (2010) using a SIM model without housing. Kaplan
and Violante (2010) report the insurance coecients implied by a SIM with a zero borrowing
limit, with a natural borrowing limit, and for dierent degrees of persistence of the permanent
earning shock. We present the coecients that Kaplan and Violante (2010) obtained for the
same persistence in permanent earning shocks that we assume in our calibration.
Table 3 shows that insurance coecients for earnings shocks in our benchmark are similar to
19Table 3: Insurance coecients
Shock Benchmark No housing Kaplan and Violante Blundell et al.
Persistent shock (%) 25.7 25.3 27.0, 30.0 36.0 (9.0)
Transitory shock (%) 81.9 82.9 82.0, 93.0 95.0 (4.0)
House price shock (%) 98.4 na na na
The rst (second) term in the fourth column correspond to an economy with a zero (natural) borrowing limit.
the ones for the economy without housing and to the ones Kaplan and Violante (2010) report for
the case with a zero borrowing limit. Note that our model without housing is a zero-borrowing-
limit model very similar to the one presented by Kaplan and Violante (2010) and our calibration
is also close to theirs.15 Thus, our ndings indicate that on average the introduction of housing
does not seem to have signicant eects on the agent's ability to self-insure against income shocks
predicted by the SIM model. In particular, our simplifying assumption on the debtors' inability
to hold nancial assets does not have major consequences on the SIM model's predictions about
their ability to self-insure. Like the coecients obtained by Kaplan and Violante (2010), our
coecients are lower than the point estimates in Blundell et al. (2008).16
Even though we do not nd a signicant eect of housing on the average insurance coe-
cients, Figure 5 shows that incorporating housing increases the coecients for younger agents.
Kaplan and Violante (2010) explain that the \misalignment between the age-prole of insurance
coecients in the model and the data is particularly acute for young individuals." Figure 5
indicates that introducing housing narrows the gap between the implications of the SIM model
and the data. This was conjectured by Kaplan and Violante (2010).
Table 3 also reports our benchmark's insurance coecients for the house price shock|Kaplan
and Violante (2010) and Blundell et al. (2008) do not study this shock. In our benchmark
calibration, 98% of the variance of the house price shock does not translate into changes in
consumption. This is consistent with the mild response of consumption to house price shocks
15The main dierence being our simplied social security system.
16Kaplan and Violante (2010) discuss how the coecients estimated by Blundell et al. (2008) may be biased.
20Figure 5: Insurance Coecients
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found by Li and Yao (2007).17 Obtaining empirical estimates of the eects of changes in house
prices on consumption is challenging, and, therefore, the range of estimates is large (see Carroll
et al., 2011, and the references therein). The mild response of consumption to house price shocks
in our model is consistent with the lower end of empirical estimates. One could expect this
response to be mild because a house is not only an investment vehicle but also a consumption
good.
To further test the extent of risk sharing in our benchmark and the eects of the house price
shock on consumption inequality, Figure 6 presents the growth in consumption dispersion over the
life cycle in the benchmark and in economies where the shocks' variances are assumed to be equal
17The framework presented by Li and Yao (2007) diers from ours in that they assume an exogenous collateral
constraint to both newly initiated mortgages and ongoing loans and that they assume i.i.d. permanent house
price shocks that are not correlated with earning shocks.
21to zero. In our model, as in the data and previous SIM models, the cross-sectional variance of log
consumption increases linearly over the life cycle and is lower and increases more slowly than the
cross-sectional variance of log income. Furthermore, the growth in the cross-sectional variance
of log consumption in our benchmark is between the range of empirical estimates.18 Figure 6
also shows that most of the consumption inequality is explained by earning shocks: When we
assume these variances are zero, consumption inequality almost disappears. In contrast, when
we assume that the variance of the house price shock is equal to zero, there is only a modest
shift in consumption inequality.
Figure 6: Inequality over the life cycle




























Consumption, no price shock economy
Consumption, no income shock economy
Consumption, no price and no income shocks economy
Income, benchmark economy
18See Storesletten et al. (2004).
22Table 4: Default and ownership under dierent down payment requirements
Benchmark  15%  20%  25%
Default rate (%) 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2
Home ownership (%) 63.1 62.9 62.5 61.8
4.3 Down payment requirements
In this section, we study the eects of imposing down payment requirements. Table 4 reports
the default and home ownership rate in economies with minimum down payments of 15%, 20%,
and 25%. This table shows that economies with a higher minimum down payment feature
a signicantly lower default rate at the cost of a mild decline in the home ownership rate.
Furthermore, as the down payment requirement increases, a given decline in the default rate
seems to imply a larger decline in home ownership.
Figure 7 presents the evolution of the default and home ownership rates after the minimum
down payment requirement is imposed in the benchmark economy. The gure shows that about
half of the long-run decline in the default rate is observed in the year when the requirement
is implemented, and most of the remaining decline in the default rate occurs over the next
10 years. For the highest down payment requirement we imposed, which results in the most
signicant decline in home ownership, it takes six years for the home ownership rate to decline
1.3 percentage points to its new long-run level.
Figure 8 shows that a majority of agents in our benchmark economy would benet from the
imposition of a minimum down payment requirement. The gure presents the distribution of wel-
fare gains from minimum down payment requirements using the distribution of agents observed in
our simulations. We measure welfare gains as consumption compensations (in percentage terms)
that make agents indierent between the benchmark economy with a non-negative down pay-
ment requirement and economies with higher minimum down payment requirements. A positive
compensation means that agents prefer the alternative economy over the benchmark economy.
23Figure 7: Transitions after the imposition of down payments requirements










































Down payment requirements make it more dicult for renters to buy a house; they are forced
to save more before buying it. The increased diculty of buying a house benets most home
owners (a thus a majority of the population). This occurs because as it becomes more dicult
to buy a house, the cost of defaulting on a mortgage and then losing the house is higher. A
higher defaulting cost decreases the default probability, and thus reduces the cost of borrowing
and allows home owners to renance their mortgage at a lower rate.
Figure 9 illustrates how the introduction of a minimum down payment requirement decreases
the cost of borrowing. This gure presents the interest rate spread (the yield the borrower has to
pay on top of the risk-free rate) as a function of the down payment. The gure is constructed for
an agent who would choose to buy a house both with or without the down payment restriction.
Dots in Figure 9 represent the optimal choice of this agent for each case. This shows that while
the minimum down payment restriction forces the agent to buy a house with a higher down
24Figure 8: Distribution of welfare gains from minimum down payment requirements











































payment, it also allows him to nance it with a lower interest rate.
The analysis presented up to here assumes that house prices are not aected by shifts in the
demand for (owner-occupied) housing implied by the imposition of down payment requirements
(i.e., it assumes the supply of housing is perfectly elastic). The extreme assumption of a perfectly
elastic housing supply is commonly used in the literature and provides a useful benchmark,
especially for studying long-run eects. However, analyzing cases with a less elastic supply of
housing may also be informative.19 Thus, we next study the other extreme case in which, after
the imposition of down payment requirements, the mean house price level,  p, declines so that
home ownership (i.e., the quantity of owner-occupied housing) does not change. This case is a
19Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2009) study the eect on mortgage defaults of an unanticipated increase in the
supply of housing that aects the endogenous house price. They assume that house prices are constant in the
steady state in which agents cannot modify their mortgage contract and can terminate this contract only if they
choose to sell the house.
25Figure 9: Borrowing opportunities and minimum down payment requirement












































useful benchmark because it gives us an upper bound on the model's prediction for the house
price decline implied by down payment requirements. We also present results for intermediate
cases in which both  p and ownership adjust.
Table 5 presents the eects of minimum down payment requirements under dierent responses
of the aggregate house price level  p. The table shows that on average, if  p declines 1%, home
ownership increases by 0.3 percentage points. This relationship is remarkably stable across
the dierent cases considered in the table. It also indicates that 0.7%, 2.0%, and 4.9% are
upper bounds for the long-run decline in the mean house price implied by the introduction of
minimum down payments of 15%, 20%, and 25%, respectively (starting from an economy with
a nonnegative down payment restriction). This table also shows that changes in the aggregate
house price level do not translate into signicant changes in the long-run default rate predicted by
the model. Furthermore, ex-ante welfare losses implied by minimum down payment requirements
26are smaller when the aggregate house price level declines. Since agents enter the economy without
houses and most of them buy houses at some point, they benet from more aordable housing.
On average, a decline in the aggregate house price level of 1% implies an ex-ante welfare gain
of 0.03%, in terms of consumption equivalent units. This relationship is also remarkably stable
across the dierent cases considered in the table.
4.4 Income Garnishment
In this section, we study the eects of allowing for income garnishment by decreasing the max-
imum income a defaulting agent can keep (denoted by ). Table 6 shows that when  is lower
(i.e., when lenders can garnish more income from defaulters), the default probability is lower
even though down payments are lower. The model's predictions are consistent with the eects of
augmenting garnishment that one would expect. Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) exploit law dier-
ences across U.S. states and nd that defaulter-friendly laws have a positive eect on the default
probability. Pence (2006) nds that the average loan size is smaller in states where foreclosure
laws are more defaulter friendly.
To give more economic content to the experiments presented in Table 6, one can think about
the income that defaulters are allowed to keep after garnishment as a percentage of median
consumption. For  = 1:45,  = 0:63, and  = 0:25, these percentages are 100%, 43%, and 17%,
respectively. Thus, Table 6 indicates that relatively low levels of post-garnishment consumption
are necessary for garnishment to have signicant eects on the default rate. However, this is in
part because for simplicity, we assume that all garnishment occurs in one year. Similar results
could be obtained by garnishing less over a longer period.
A long literature (in law, history, and economics) has emphasized that facilitating defaults
can be welfare enhancing because the ability to repudiate debts can play an important role
in helping agents fend against adverse shocks (see Athreya et al., 2009; Bolton and Jeanne,
2005; Grochulski, 2010, and references therein). Table 7 shows that the eects of strengthening
garnishment (and thus increasing the cost of defaulting) on the agents' ability to self-insure are
minimal. The variance of log consumption and the insurance coecients are almost identical





Min down payment = 15%
 p decline, % 0.0 0.3 0.7
Home ownership, % 62.9 63.0 63.1
Default rate, % 0.4 0.4 0.4
Ex-ante welfare gain, % -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
Min down payment = 20%
 p decline, % 0.0 1.0 2.0
Home ownership, % 62.5 62.8 63.1
Default rate, % 0.3 0.3 0.3
Ex-ante welfare gain, % -0.09 -0.06 -0.04
Min down payment = 25%
 p decline, % 0.0 3.0 4.9
Home ownership, % 61.8 62.5 63.1
Default rate, % 0.2 0.2 0.2
Ex-ante welfare gain, % -0.20 -0.11 -0.06
28Table 6: Summary statistics under dierent garnishment rules
Benchmark  = 1:45  = 0:63  = 0:25
Default rate (%) 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.1
Home ownership (%) 63.1 63.7 67.4 69.8
Median down payment (%) 19.0 16.8 9.0 6.6
Table 7: Insurance under dierent garnishment rules
Benchmark  = 1:45  = 0:63  = 0:25
Var(log C) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Persistent-income-shock insurance coecient (%) 25.7 24.9 23.6 23.2
Transitory-income-shock insurance coecient (%) 81.9 81.6 80.3 80.3
Price-shock insurance coecient (%) 98.4 98.4 98.3 98.1
across economies with dierent degrees of garnishment.
The ndings presented in the previous paragraph imply that legislation that protects default-
ers would be dicult to justify for its eects on consumption smoothing. There are three forces
behind these ndings. First, the share of agents who benet from debt forgiveness after default-
ing is small. Even without garnishment, mortgage defaults are triggered by unlikely declines in
house prices. Figure 10 indicates the strong correlation between mortgage defaults and equity
(and thus house price shocks).20 Second, benets from debt forgiveness are not well targeted
to low-income agents. In our benchmark economy (without garnishment), the mean income of
defaulting agents is lower than the mean income of non-defaulters, but defaults by agents with
20It should be mentioned that, in the gure, equity is calculated using the house price and not the price minus
the selling cost, which is relevant for the agents' default decision. This is why there are defaults with positive
equity in the gure. Empirical studies document the importance of home equity for default decisions. See, for
example, Bajari et al. (2008), Campbell and Dietrich (1983), Deng et al. (2000), Mayer et al. (2009), and Schwartz
and Torous (2003).
29relatively high income are frequent. This is illustrated in Figure 11, which shows the income
distribution of defaulters (top panel) and non-defaulters (bottom panel). Third, as illustrated
by the insurance coecients presented in Table 7, the average eects of changes in house prices
on consumption is small and is not signicantly aected by the degree of garnishment in the
economy.
Figure 10: Equity distributions in the benchmark economy






























Equity, percentage of house value
The minimal eects of garnishment on the agents' ability to self-insure contrasts with the
signicant eects of this policy on the agents' ability to borrow (illustrated by the changes in
down payment levels presented in Table 6). Figure 12 further illustrates how garnishment relaxes
borrowing constraints. This gure presents the interest rate spread as a function of the down
30Figure 11: Income distributions in the benchmark economy

























Conditional on no default
Income
payment for an agent who would choose to buy a house both with or without garnishment, with
the dots representing the optimal choice of this agent for each case. It shows that garnishment
allows the agent to have a mortgage with both a lower down payment and a lower interest
rate. The relaxation of the agents' borrowing constraints implied by garnishment has signicant
eects on home ownership. The results presented in Table 6 show that when we allow for
enough garnishment to almost eliminate defaults, home ownership increases by more than 6
percentage points. Figure 13 indicates that the increase in the level of home ownership implied
by garnishment is generated by precipitating the decision of becoming a home owner. That the
eect of garnishment is stronger for young agents is not surprising because these agents typically
31are borrowing constrained and nd it more dicult to pay down payments.
Figure 12: Borrowing opportunities and income garnishment












































Figure 14 presents the evolution of the default and home ownership rates after garnishment is
imposed. We assume that the garnishment rule becomes eective one period after its announce-
ment and it applies to both new and existing loans. This is the way in which the 2005 reform in
the bankruptcy legislation|that made ling for bankruptcy harder|was introduced. The pos-
sibility of defaulting in the announcement period before the imposition of garnishment reduces
the negative eect of imposing garnishment on existing loans. Figure 14 shows that this creates
a spike in defaults in the announcement period, which is consistent with the spike in bankruptcy
llings observed before the implementation of the 2005 reform. Agents who are likely to default
in the future prefer to default before garnishment is introduced. This gure also shows that after
the initial spike, the default rate falls drastically (to zero in the case of  = 0:25) because agents
who were likely to default did so before the imposition of garnishment. After that sharp decline
32Figure 13: Home ownership over the life cycle, dierent garnishments









































the default rate increases to its long-run value. In addition, Figure 14 shows that for the harsher
garnishment policy we consider, it takes up to 10 years for the home ownership rate to increase
6.6 percentage points to its new long-run level.
Figure 15 shows that almost all agents in our benchmark economy would benet from the
imposition of income garnishment. Since an increase in income garnishment does not have a
signicant negative eect on the agents' ability to self-insure but it has a signicant positive
eect on their ability to borrow, for most agents welfare increases with the level of garnishment
in the economy. However, as explained above, since we impose garnishment also on existing
loans, debtors who are very likely to default are harmed by this policy.
As we did when we studied down payment requirements, we now consider cases with changes
in the aggregate house price level  p. Table 8 presents the eects of income garnishment under
dierent responses of  p. This table shows that on average, if  p increases 1%, home ownership
33Figure 14: Transitions after the imposition of income garnishment







































declines by 0.3 percentage points and ex-ante welfare declines 0.03%, in terms of consumption
equivalent units. Additionally, Table 8 shows that garnishment could imply increases in house
prices of up to 27% if the housing supply does not adjust. These price increases imply a deterio-
ration of housing aordability that washes out most of the ex-ante welfare gains from introducing
garnishment.





 p increase, % 0.0 1.0 2.0
Home ownership, % 63.7 63.4 63.1
Default rate, % 0.6 0.6 0.6
Ex-ante welfare gain, % 0.16 0.13 0.10
 = 0:63
 p increase, % 0.0 9.4 15.8
Home ownership, % 67.4 65.0 63.1
Default rate, % 0.4 0.4 0.4
Ex-ante welfare gain, % 0.64 0.34 0.15
 = 0:25
 p increase, % 0.0 13.9 27.4
Home ownership, % 69.8 66.3 63.1
Default rate, % 0.1 0.1 0.1
Ex-ante welfare gain, % 0.85 0.41 0.04
35Figure 15: Distribution of welfare gains from income garnishment












































We incorporated house price risk and mortgages into a SIM model and showed that the model
produces plausible implications for mortgage borrowing and default behavior. We also showed
that incorporating housing does not have a signicant eect on the average income insurance
coecients obtained with the SIM model but it increases the values of the coecients for young
agents. Furthermore, we found that the response of consumption to house price shocks in the
model is minimal. We studied two policies intended to mitigate mortgage default risk: Imposing
minimum down payment requirements and imposing garnishment of defaulters' income. We
showed that both policies would reduce the mortgage default rate and would benet a majority
of agents. While down payment requirements reduce the default rate because there are fewer
agents with low equity, in the case of garnishment there are more agents with low equity, but
36there are fewer defaults because the cost of defaulting is higher.
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